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NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
AND PENAL THEORY
IN SPANISH ABORTION
LAWt
RICHARD STITH*
The abortion debate in the United States is a clash of individualisms:
the proponents of individual rights for putative unborn persons array
themselves against the advocates of individual rights for women. Al-
though the Left sides almost exclusively with the latter,' it is hard to
discern anything more than a tactical nexus of abortion-related issues
with the socialist goal of community-based decisionmaking.'
Not so in European law. The important 1975 West German decision
mandated laws against abortion from a dramatically communitarian per-
spective,' as has been so ably pointed out by Donald Kommers.' The
t Reprinted in substantial part from 35 AM. J. ComP. L. 513 (1987). Copyright 0 1987 by the
American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, Inc.
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. A.B. 1965, Harvard University; M.A. 1967, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley; M. Phil. 1971, Yale University; J.D. 1973, Yale Law School;
Ph.D. 1973, Yale University. The author is indebted for the assistance of Professors Antonio
Carlos Pereira, Antonio Garcia Cuadrado, Cole Durham, Mary Ann Glendon, John Gorby,
Donald Kommers, and John Potts, as well as to Paige Cunningham.
Mark Tushnet, a former coordinator and still a frequent speaker for the Critical Legal
Studies movement, has called the right to reproductive choice "a leftish sort of right which,
it is said, leftists must recognize as not relative lest they lose their political credentials."
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1365 (1984). Note, however, that
Tushnet goes on to argue such a right would no longer make sense even to leftists in a
society slightly different from our own. See also infra note 21.
Quintano Ripolles, in his historical analysis of abortion legislation, is puzzled by the fact
that at the political level European socialists have long tended to favor more elective abor-
tion, despite the "individualism" he sees represented by such a position. He theorizes that
past explicit use of anti-abortion laws to increase the armies and labor forces of capitalist
nations may have caused socialists to oppose such laws. I would add that the Left's commit-
ments to sexual equality could also point in this direction. But neither demographic decline
nor women's equality seems necessarily to further the development of socialism. Quintano
Ripolles, 1 Tratado de Derecho Penal, in PARTE ESPECIAL 504-05 (1962).
' Decision of 25 February 1975, [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1. Translated into English by Jonas &
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Spanish Constitutional Court decision of 11 April 1985,' which was
strongly influenced by the German one,6 is in many (but not all) ways
even more communitarian than that prior opinion. Indeed, it may not be
too much to say that social constitutional jurisprudence in the West may
well find a landmark in this Spanish case. Socialism is relevant to abor-
tion after all, but in a way quite different from that which might superfi-
cially have been expected.
The key point, to be developed below, is that the Spanish court con-
siders the fetus neither a person possessing rights, as U.S. pro-life people
argue, nor subject to a person possessing rights as pro-choicers argue. In-
stead, unborn life is treated as a distinct constitutionally protected legal
good. The nature of this Spanish status of the fetus as a public value will
be elucidated in this commentary, and its status will be compared with
that of unborn life according to the highest tribunals of Germany and the
United States.
It will further be seen that the use of this value to require the prohi-
bition of elective abortion is intimately linked in Spain, more explicitly
than in Germany, with the communitarian ideal of the "Social State."
U.S. constitutional doctrine, being much more individualist, might well
not have required such a result even if the fetus had been recognized by
our Supreme Court to have a very high public value.
Yet the Spanish and German decisions contain a surprise: At the
same time that they base the protection of fetal life on the importance of
public values, they withdraw that protection when continuation of a preg-
Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade-With Commentaries,
9 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 551 (1976).
' Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Germany, 25 AM. J. COMP.
L. 255, 280-84 (1977) [hereinafter Kommers, Abortion and Constitution]; Kommers, Lib-
erty and Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases in Constitutional Per-
spective, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371, 391-99. For a quite useful critique from an individualist
perspective, see Gerstein & Lowry, Abortion, Abstract Norms, and Social Control: The De-
cision of the West German Federal Constitutional Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 849 (1976).
1 Decision of 11 April 1985, STC 53/1985 (Pleno). The official version was first published in
119 BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO 10 (suplemento, 18 mayo 1985) [hereinafter BOE], but I
have hereinafter cited the clearer and perhaps more accessible 1985-49 BOLETIN DE JURIS-
PRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL 515 [hereinafter BJC].
' I do not believe this assertion to be controversial. The Spanish decision refers repeatedly
to the German one in summarizing arguments of counsel. BJC, supra note 5, at 521, 523,
526, 527. In the Comision de Justiciae Interior debates on 25 February 1983, opposition
leader Ruiz Gallard6n referred to the government's repeated statements that German law
had been an inspiration for the present abortion depenalization proposal. The responding
Justice Minister, Ledesma Bartret, did not dispute this assertion. Bartret, Cortes Generales,
Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, II LEGISLATURA, Num. 18, 1983, at 6 ff. According
to Ernst Benda, former President of the Constitutional Court of West Germany, the Span-
ish Court itself has been modeled on the German one. See Benda, Constitutional Jurisdic-
tion in West Germany, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1981).
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nancy is "too much to demand" or "nondemandable" ("inexigible" and
"unzumutbar," in the words of the Spanish and German courts respec-
tively) of the individual pregnant woman. I will point out that abortion in
such hardship cases may come under a paradoxical category of penal the-
ory in which individuals are legally justified (not merely excused) in doing
that which from the standpoint of public legal values remains unjustified.
This individualist doctrinal counterthrust may be just as important as the
communitarian expansion occurring in the same Spanish abortion case.
References to Germany and to the U.S. will again make this clear.
Before turning to case analysis, however, it would be well to define
with greater precision the basic categories I have been and will be using:
To the degree to which a "community" (or "socialism") exists, shared
public values are effectively pursued by all. As long as those values inhere
in states of being rather than in conduct considered right in itself, rules
are unimportant. For example, if neighbors were to gather to build a com-
mon barn, it would be silly to set down rules granting individual claim
rights to hammers. There would no doubt be temporary rule-like guide-
lines provided, in order to aid coordination, but the common goal would
be to use hammers wherever they are most needed. No individual would
insist on getting his or her prescribed turn with a hammer, if a neighbor
could use it better for their shared purpose.
By contrast, to the degree to which a society is 'individualist,' there
are no public values. All goals are personal and private, and human be-
ings interact only insofar as necessary in order for each to achieve his or
her private values. Consequently, rules are very important. For example,
if a number of individuals are constructing their own separate barns, and
there is a scarcity of tools, they will surely set down a set of rules for
sharing hammers. These rules will differ from the temporary guidelines
used by the neighbors above not only in their substance but also in their
lack of flexibility. Private planning requires certainty about rules, re-
quires rights. This is particularly so if the others involved are competitors
or even enemies, so that one is disinclined to relinquish a turn at the
hammer even if one happens to have run out of nails.
At a constitutional level, a court might impose one or the other of
these models. It might insist that the State require all to work together
for a common goal (e.g., life), or it might insist that the State refrain from
coordinating common pursuits in order to further the private values of
individuals. Or, of course, it might do neither and let the whole matter
remain in the hands of legislatures.
CHRONOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF THE DECISION
Prior to the bill here at issue, the Spanish Penal Code did not explic-
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itly exempt any abortions from punishment.' However, the general de-
fense of necessity includes an exemption for acts done to avoid harm
equal to or greater than the harm caused,8 which would make non-pun-
ishable at least those abortions necessary to preserve maternal life."
Soon after the sweeping Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE)
electoral victory of 1982, which gave the party an absolute majority in the
Spanish legislature, the new government proposed an addendum to prior
abortion law,10 declaring abortion unpunishable in certain circumstances.
As approved by the Congress of Deputies on 6 October 1983, and by the
Senate on 30 November 1983, the bill read:
Abortion will not be punishable if performed by a physician, with the con-
sent of the woman, when any one of the following circumstances is present:
1. That it is necessary in order to avoid a serious danger to the life or
health of the pregnant woman.
2. That the pregnancy is the consequence of an act constituting the
crime of rape under art. 429, provided that the abortion is performed within
the first twelve weeks of gestation and that the aforementioned act has been
reported.
3. That it is probable that the fetus will be born with serious physical
or mental defects, provided that the abortion is performed within the first
twenty-two weeks of gestation and that the unfavorable prognosis is regis-
tered in an opinion issued by two medical specialists other than the one
operating on the pregnant woman.11
The post-Franco Spanish Constitution of 1978 established for the
first time a Constitutional Court with the power of judicial review of stat-
utes. 12 Consistent with the Kelsenian European tradition, a petition alleg-
Codigo Penal arts. 411-17. Published as Codigo Penal y legislacion complemantaria
(1984).
' Codigo Penal art. 8(7).
' The supplemental brief of the anti-abortion petitioners (dated 3 January 1983 [sic]) fur-
ther states that in practice abortion was never punished when done for any of the reasons
listed in the government's abortion depenalization bill. See infra note 11 and accompanying
text. Therefore, the brief argues, statutory reform serves no purpose except to prepare the
way for fully elective abortion.
10 The addendum was to be inserted at the end of the existing sections on abortion and
numbered "417 bis."
11 This is a translation of the bill as it appears in the Constitutional Court's opinion STC
53/1985, of 11 April, as published in the BJC, supra note 5, at 531, which is slightly modi-
fied in capitalization and punctuation from the version earlier printed in the BOE, supra
note 5.
12 The Court is made up of twelve members (four chosen by three-fifths of the Congress,
four by three-fifths of the Senate, two by the current government, and two by the General
Council of the Judicial Power), as authorized by article 159 (1) of the Constitution of 1978
[as found in Leyes politicas del Estado (1984)]. Members are elected for nine-year terms,
which are staggered over three-year cycles. Art. 159(3).
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ing unconstitutionality may be interposed by certain authorized persons,
without the need to await a concrete injury."8 A 1979 sub-constitutional
law, repealed in 1985, further established the right of these same persons
to insist thatthe Court hear such a petition before certain allegedly un-
constitutional bills could enter into effect."'
On 2 December 1983, the latter sort of petition was filed in the name
of fifty-four Deputies led by the conservative Alianza Popular party. Af-
ter receiving a series of supplements and responses during the first half of
1984, the Constitutional Court finally announced its decision on 11 April
1985. The abortion reform bill was declared in certain details to be an
unconstitutional violation of article 15 of the Constitution, which reads
"All have the right to life and to physical and moral integrity. .. ." ("to-
dos tienen derecho a la vida y a la integridad fisica y moral .... "). Al-
though the twelve members of the Court were evenly divided for and
against this declaration, Spanish practice in effect permitted a second and
tie-breaking vote to be cast by the President of the Court, Dr. Manuel
Garcia Pelayo y Alonso, an ex-soldier for the Spanish Republic who be-
came an internationally-known scholar during his years outside of
Spain."8
After a lengthy development of the arguments presented by the peti-
tioners and by the governmental respondent, the Court built its position
on twelve "Legal Foundations" (Fundamentos Juridicos), concluding
with the holding of unconstitutionality. Five dissenting opinions, one of
which is co-authored, follow.
The Court's argument in brief paraphrase is this: Human life is a
superior constitutional value (Legal Foundation, hereinafter L.F., 3) and
a Social State such as Spain has an affirmative duty to secure it by law
(L.F. 4). This life is a reality distinct from the mother from the beginning
of gestation and, therefore, the "one to be born" (nasciturus)l' must be
" Art. 162(1)(a) of the Constitution of 1978.
" Organic Law of the Constitutional Court (Ley Orgfnica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tri-
bunal Constitucional) art. 79(2). Repealed by Ley Orginica 4/1985, de 7 de junio (BOE
num. 137, de 8 de junio).
" The vote was not exactly along socialist versus conservative lines. Of the six members of
the "majority," two were those nominated by the General Council of the Judicial Power.
The Court's president had been approved by the PSOE. The remaining three were originally
proposed by the old centrist party, the UCD, which virtually disappeared in the 1982 elec-
tions. The only woman on the court co-authored the resulting Court opinion. El tribunal de
los 12, El Pais, 12 April 1985, at 13. Additional chronological and biographical details may
be found on the same page. See Asi votaron los doce magistrados, Ya, 12 April 1985, at 5;
Diaro 16, 12 April 1985, at 6-7.
" The Latin word "nasciturus" is here translated literally into English, despite the resul-
tant oddity of speaking of the "one to be born" perhaps being aborted. "Fetus" would not
be an acceptable alternative because the Spanish court had available, and elsewhere used,
the equivalent "feto." Simply leaving the term untranslated would also not be appropriate,
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considered a "legal good" (bien juridico) accorded protection by the Con-
stitution. Legislative history indicates that the framers of the Constitu-
tion intended this result (L.F. 5), even though neither Spanish nor inter-
national law requires the conclusion that the one to be born possesses a
personal subjective right to this protection (LL.FF. 5, 6, and 7). Such pro-
tection must be effective and, if necessary, include penal sanctions, al-
though it need not be absolute (L.F. 7).
The Constitution also guarantees personal dignity, which includes
rights such as free development of one's personality, physical and moral
integrity, and personal and family intimacy (L.F. 8). When constitutional
values collide, the legislator must weigh them and try to harmonize them
or, if necessary, to specify the conditions under which one may prevail.
He must also not forget the limits to what is reasonably demandable by
the penal law. In carrying out his judgments, he need not turn only to the
generalized exemptions from punishment found in article 8 of the Penal
Code, but may use a different technique for certain crimes such as abor-
tion (L.F. 9).
After disposing of statutory vagueness problems-by indicating, for
example, that a "serious danger" is one which involves an important and
permanent diminution of physical or mental health (L.F. 10)-the Court
applies the foregoing principles to the bill in question. There is nothing
unconstitutional in permitting the destruction of unborn life where the
mother's life is at stake. Given a "serious danger" to her health, the
mother's own right to life and to physical integrity is affected; not to pun-
ish abortion here is constitutional, especially in light of what is demand-
able by penal law. Rape violates personal dignity in the highest degree,
and the law clearly cannot demand that the victim bear its consequences.
As for the case of serious physical or mental fetal defects, recourse to
penal sanctions against abortion would impose conduct beyond that
which is normally demandable of a mother (L.F. 11).
The constitutionality of the non-punishment of abortion in such cir-
cumstances has thus been established, according to the Court. However,
the State continues to have an obligation effectively to guarantee the life
and health both of the woman and of the one to be born. It must, there-
fore, make sure that neither the former nor the latter is disprotected any
more than may be required by those circumstances. For the protection of
the woman, the State should provide that the abortion take place in pub-
lic or private health centers authorized for this purpose. For the protec-
tion of the one to be born, in order to be certain that the first type of
for the Latin word would not have the same feel in English as it would in Spanish. "Nas-
citurus" would connote a birth-related being to the educated Spanish reader, both because
of its clear link to the Spanish nacer (to be born) and because of its most frequent use in
civil law contexts where, in fact, the expectation of birth is uppermost in mind.
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circumstance (serious maternal life or health danger) exists, the Constitu-
tion demands that the opinion of a medical specialist be obtained prior to
the abortion. Similarly, the opinions of the two specialists regarding any
fetal disabilities must be obtained in advance of any abortion. Such
changes, without excluding other possible ones, would permit the bill fi-
nally to be enacted into law (L.F. 12).17
In the last two sections of its opinion, the Court declines to require
paternal participation in the abortion decision (L.F. 13), or to enter into
subsidiary civil law issues such as the relation of non-punishable abortion
to social insurance. It does point out, though, that conscientious objection
to abortion is protected by the Constitution (L.F. 14).
PRENATAL LIFE AS A LEGAL VALUE FOR THE COMMUNITY
The Constitutional Court of Spain finds that the one to be born has
not been shown to possess any constitutional rights. At the same time,
the fetus is protected by the Constitution, and indeed is protected by the
sentence "All have the right to life. . . ." Let us look more closely at the
reasoning and results of these apparently contradictory findings by the
Court.
The idea that our objective legal duties necessarily correspond to
others' subjective rights is not universal,"8 being in the form we know it a
development of late scholastic nominalism"s and Enlightenment individu-
17 The government did not delay in complying with the Court's demands. On 12 July 1985,
a new enactment was published in BOE, supra note 5, no. 166. (Ley Organica 9/1985, de 5
de julio, de reforma del articulo 417 his del Codigo Penal). The significant changes are as
follows: The new law contains a preliminary paragraph requiring abortions to be done in an
accredited health center, and requires a prior second medical opinion confirming that an
abortion is necessary to avoid a serious danger to the life or health (which now explicitly
includes mental health) of the pregnant woman. The law, however, does not require the
second opinion (nor the woman's express consent) in an emergency. A new section indicates,
in accordance with a remark of the Court, that the pregnant woman will not be punished
even when an (otherwise non-punishable) abortion occurs in violation of the requirements of
a health center or of confirming medical opinions.
Regulations setting accreditation standards have become a focus of controversy under
the new law.
1 See, e.g., Lacruz Berdejo, El Derecho Subjetivo, 3 ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO CivIL, PARTE
GENERAL 77-87 (1984); see also Benn, Rights, in 7 ENCYCL. PHIL. 195 (1967); BENDITT, RIGHTS
3-8 (1982); Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 171-202
(Simpson ed. 1973). The best short histories in English of the idea of a right may be FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 205-10 (1980) and Golding, The Concept of Rights: A
Historical Sketch, in BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Bandman & Bandman eds. 1978). See
generally Golding, Justice and Rights: A Study in Relationship, in JUSTICE AND HEALTH
CARE 23-35 (Shelp ed. 1981).
19 Professor Michel Villey has defended the thesis that William of Ockham was among the
first fully to conceptualize subjective rights over property. Ockham did so, according to Vil-
ley, in order to permit the Franciscans more easily to renounce such rights and thus to fulfill
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alism. Some cultures apparently have no need to reify the benefits of the
legal order and ascribe the ownership of these abstract benefits (primar-
ily, the power to choose to make claims) to individual actors or subjects
(whence "subjective"). Even today, we ordinarily think of the criminal
law as a set of duties which do not respond to individual claims. I cer-
tainly have a duty not to steal from my neighbor, but only the State, not
my neighbor, has the right to insist that I not do so under pain of crimi-
nal sanction. Analytically, the idea that duties need not entail rights is
defended by a number of philosophers today. 0 The rise of socializing le-
gal theory has also put pressure on the idea of individual claim rights as a
foundation of the legal order.
2 1
The received European legal protections accorded to the fetus cannot
easily be squeezed into this modern subjective rights ideology.12 Of the
many nations following Continental traditions, apparently only Argentina
has seen fit to acknowledge civil personality from the moment of concep-
tion.2 s The image of the person as a bargainer and a litigator indeed does
not seem applicable to unborn life. Of course, children after birth likewise
their radical vows of poverty. At the same time as they renounced civil claims to property,
they could continue to administer and to use it in a physical sense. See VILLEY, Droit sub-
jectif, in SEIZE ESSAIS DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 140 (1969).
"' See, e.g., Weiss, The Perils of Personhood, ETHICS, Oct. 1978, at 66; HAUERWAS, TRUTH-
FULNESS AND TRAGEDY 174 ff. and notes (1977); see also FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 135-39, 144 (1980). The inverse proposition, that the absence of rights
need not entail the absence of duties has been well and relevantly put in Montague, Two
Concepts of Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 372, 384 (1980):
I suppose there is a sense in which I would deny that those incapable of acting
intentionally have rights, but I do not see that doing so has any mortally objectiona-
ble consequences. It isn't as if, for example, that by denying that infants have a right
to self-defense I am sanctioning infanticide; what I have said here implies only that
the immortality of infanticide cannot be grounded on the rights of infants. Infanti-
cide-as well as such things as cruelty to animals and non-therapeutic experimenta-
tion on the severely retarded-is immoral even if infants, animals, and the severely
retarded have no (exercisable) rights.
Id.
21 Lacruz Berdejo, supra note 18, at 85; see, e.g., MARx, On the Jewish Question, in EARLY
WRITINGS 211, 230-31 (1975); SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). The
socialist Mark Tushnet, see supra note 1, and Louis M. Seidman have explicitly argued for
the permissibility of fetal protection on a non-rights basis in A Comment on Tooley's
"Abortion and Infanticide," ETHICS, Jan. 1986, at 350.
Mirian Damaska's comprehensive new treatise contrasting the reactive and the activist
state is a particularly rich theoretical context within which to understand the relative ab-
sence of rights in socialist law. See M. D^AsKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE. AUTHOR-
Try 83 (1986).
2 Lacruz Berdejo, supra note 18, at 93-94.
"2 Quintano Ripoll~s, supra note 2, at 477. But cf. 6 JIMANEZ DE AS(JA, TRATAO DE DERECHO
PENAL 988 n.36 (2d ed. 1962) (arguing that the fetus still does not count as a "visible per-
son" under Argentine law).
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possess these traits of legal personality only in potentia, yet they are ac-
corded personhood (though the exercise thereof is necessarily by a repre-
sentative), so that the exclusion of fetuses remains problematic. " In any
event, prior to 1985 many or most Spanish legal theorists granted the
fetus a status lower than that of a person, perhaps even lower than that
recognized in France or Italy. 5
Anti-abortion strategy during the constitutional debates if anything
reenforced the non-personhood of the fetus. Fearful that the sentence
"All persons have the right to life. . ." could be read to protect only those
who under the Civil Code had personality, i.e., those who had been born
and were able to survive twenty-four hours,2" opponents of abortion sub-
stituted the sentence "All have the right to life. . . " for the explicit pur-
pose of protecting the unborn from abortion.2 7 It became difficult for a
court to say that a fetus is a constitutional person when the word "per-
son" had been struck from the Constitution in order to ensure the inclu-
sion of fetuses.
The Constitutional Court in fact does not argue the issue of legal
personality as such. Instead, it considers the closely related (if not ulti-
mately identical in modern law) issue of whether fetuses are titulares, i.e.,
bearers or possessors, of a subjective constitutional right to life. It finds
that they are not, a conclusion in accordance with the mainstream of
Spanish legal tradition.
The Court nevertheless was faced with the apparently unanimous
opinion of Spanish medical associations that the unborn child is a living
human being.2 s From the materials available, the government does not
24 The existence of infant persons can support the assertion that potentiality is sufficient for
personhood and therefore that the unborn are likewise persons. See ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA
ESPANOLA 709; see also RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 509 (1971) (maintaining that potential
rationality must be the basis for nonarbitrary recognition of rights); infra note 43 and ac-
companying text (German high court's argument). Contrary resolutions are possible. It is
common today for abortion-related philosophizing to end in approval of infanticide. See,
e.g., Weiss, supra note 20 (citing the authors Tooley and Warren).
2" Quintano Ripoll~s, supra note 2, at 471 if; see also Rodriguez Devesa, Derecho penal
espanol, in PARTE ESPECIAL 100 n.42 (7th ed. 1979) (arguing that feticide has never been
considered homicide). See generally Cuello Calon, 2(2) DERECHO PENAL 522 (13th ed. 1972).
Not all the juristic data are clear. For example, for civil purposes the prenatal child is condi-
tionally considered born and the possessor of rights, provided that it eventually emerges
viable from the womb. CoDIGo CIVIL art. 29 (published as CODIGO CIVIL (8th ed. 1984)). In
criminal law, the Penal Code prohibits consensual abortion under the title "Crimes against
Persons" ("Delitos contra las personas"). CODIGO PENAL, TITULO VIII.
' CODIGO CIVIL arts. 29-30.
27 Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, Num. 105, 6 July 1978, at 3952 ff. The summary of
these debates is at L.F. 5 of the decision presently being considered.
8 The petitioners submitted statements from various medical associations to this effect,
and the government submitted none to the contrary, or at least none the Court thought
worth mentioning. See BJC, supra note 5, at 525; see also The Human Life Bill-S. 158,
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appear to have disputed the physical fact of human life prior to birth.
Instead, it approached the issue wholly formalistically, arguing that legal
norms are independent of non-legal facts-a hard position to take when it
comes to documents like constitutions which are meant to limit the legal
order for the sake of a socially preferred physical reality. Moreover, the
Court conceded that the substitution of "all" for "all persons" had been
intended to project nascent life. How could the Court conceptualize the
legal status of living but unborn human beings?
Traditional Spanish legal doctrine may have provided some help. Not
all legal goods in Spanish law have to pertain to individuals, or even to
the State, in the manner of property ownership. Goods in the public do-
main and communal goods have long been recognized. 9 It has been ar-
gued that society, rather than the fetus or the mother, is the titular of the
protection accorded to the unborn child.3" Anti-abortion spokespersons
had argued that even without a subjective right, the fetus may be protect-
able by an objective norm, as a "social good.""1 The Spanish Supreme
Court (which does not have the power of judicial review nor of authorita-
tive constitutional interpretation given to the Constitutional Court) in-
deed asserted in its decision of 11 January 1984 that:
Human life in its formation is a good that constitutionally merits pro-
tection, is a constitutional legal good, a legal good of the community and not
an individual legal good .... 11
Even spokespersons for the right to abortion were willing to concede
that the unborn are a legal good of the community.3 3 Some interpreted
such a concession to mean, however, that what the community possessed
it could dispose of by its representatives in the legislature, and thus that
Report to the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981) (arguing that there is a scientific consensus concern-
ing the fact that life begins at conception but not concerning the value to be accorded to
that life). The U.S. report was cited by the Spanish petitioners in their brief of amplifica-
tion, dated 3 January 1983 [sic], at 7.
19 Lacruz Berdejo, supra note 18, at 42 if., 51-55.
1o Quintano Ripolles, supra note 2, at 477 (reporting some support for all three
possibilities).
" Diaz Fuentes calls the fetus a "social good" in Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, No. 105,
5 October 1983, at 2943. Oscar Alzaga is cited by Cerezo Mir in note 46 of his essay La
regulacion del aborto en el proyecto de nuevo Codigo Penal Espanol, in LA REFORMA PENAL
(1982), to the effect that the fetus is protected by an objective norm even without a subjec-
tive right.
"I TS 2a Sala, 15 octubre 1983, reported in La Ley, 11 enero 1984, at 1. Reversed (in effect)
on other grounds by the Constitutional Court. TC 2a Sala 75/1984, 27 de junio, reported in
La Ley, 24 octubre 1984, at 1.
3 Sotillo Marti stated his agreement with the German high court that life in the womb is a
legal good protected by the Constitution. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados,
Sesiones informativas de Comisiones, No. 61, 7 septiembre 1983, at 2139.
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the legislative depenalization of abortion was constitutionally permissi-
ble.3 " Perhaps for this reason, the anti-abortion briefs in this case resist
the idea that the one to be born is only a legal good rather than a posses-
sor of the right to life."5
Like the Spanish Supreme Court in the quotation above, the Consti-
tutional Court in effect takes the traditional concept of the unborn as a
protected legal good and inserts it into the constitutional "system of val-
ues." (LL. FF. 3, 4, 9). Since the Constitution emanates from the commu-
nity, it would seem (though the Constitutional Court does not use these
precise words) that the unborn are a legal good or value "of the commu-
nity." But because of the superiority of the Constitution to ordinary legis-
lation, the community has in effect made a commitment to the value of
unborn life such that it no longer retains a right freely to dispose of that
life by legislation. The community could also be seen to be simply ac-
knowledging a preexisting and binding inherent value in such life. In ei-
ther case, one might say that the one to be born has become not so much
a good "of' the community, in a proprietary sense, but a good "for" the
community, a good at whose furtherance the community is aiming.
It is worth pointing out that the very idea that there exists an objec-
tive order of values in a constitution is communitarian rather than indi-
vidualist, because it makes the good, at least in part, public rather than
private. Such an order (i.e., not only a list but also a hierarchy) of explicit
and implicit values mandates not only a minimum set of formal rules
which government and citizens must observe, but a set of goals they must
aim at-particularly when combined with the idea of the Social State dis-
cussed later in this commentary.
Within this value order, life is not just any value, according to the
Spanish Court, but is a "superior value" (L.F. 3), a "fundamental value"
(L.F. 5), and a "central value" (L.F. 9). The Court reaches this conclusion
by noting that life is a presupposition for all other rights, and by reflect-
"4 The article by Luis Arroyo Zapatero develops the idea that what the community gives,
the community can take away. Arroyo Zapatero, Prohibicion del aborto y Constitucion, 3
REV. FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE 195 (1980); see infra note 69
and accompanying text. The Constitutional Court's summary of the government arguments
indicates that the latter admitted the existence of unborn life as a legal good, but claimed
that the legislature had discretion over its protection. BJC, supra note 5, at 526-28. Four of
the dissenters to the final decision conceded that preborn life is or has some kind of legal
value.
" See, e.g., BJC, supra note 5, at 523 (summarizing petitioners' argument that life is funda-
mental right or an absolute value rather than merely a legal good). Published anti-abortion-
ist opinions had already rejected arguments like those of Arroyo Zapatero. See F. ThuLLO-
FIGUEROA, LA LEGALIZACION DEL ABORTO EN EL DERECHO COMPARADO 113; Diez Moreno, El
proyecto de Ley del Aborto desde la perspectiva constitucional, in EN DEFENSA DE LA VIDA
181-89 (1983).
32 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
ing upon the placement of the right to life at the head of the list of con-
stitutional protections (L.F. 3). The unborn are taken to "embody" (L.F.
5) this value, both because the framers of the Constitution apparently
intended the unborn to be protected by the right to life clause of that
document, and because of the fact, noted by the Court, that human life is
a "reality from the beginning of gestation" (L.F. 5).
At the same time that the Court grants the fetus a high status as a
"constitutionally protected legal good" (L.F. 7), it balances its conclusion
by refusing to consider the unborn to "possess" the right to life, as dis-
cussed above, and by the curious and unexplained remark that at birth,
not before or after, the fetus acquires "full human individuality" (L.F. 5).
Moreover, a careful reading of the opinion will show that the Court never
explicitly acknowledges that the fetus is among the "all" referred to in
the protective phrase "All have the right to life. .. ."
Let us try to understand this argument by means of an irreverent
and slightly analogous hypothetical. Suppose the U.S. Constitution con-
tained the following language: "All bald eagles, as the sacred symbol of
the nation, have the right to life." Suppose further that the framers of
this clause had inserted the word "all" for the precise purpose of protect-
ing embryonic eagles as well as hatched eagles. Would we have to con-
clude that inside an egg is an eagle, or that a bird embryo has its own
constitutional rights, in order to consider eagle eggs constitutionally pro-
tected? I think not. Such protection could be founded simply on our
sense that an important meaning and purpose of the Constitution would
be thwarted if eagle omelettes came into vogue.
The precise effort of the Court's elevation of fetal value is this: The
Court affirms the superiority, or even the equality, of the mother's rights
over the legal value of the fetus at most only in those situations covered
in the first statutory depenalization, i.e., where the mother's life or health
is seriously endangered, both of which values are found in the same Con-
stitutional article held to protect the unborn (L.F. 12). In order to uphold
the other two depenalizations, the Court turns instead to the doctrine of
non-demandability discussed at the end of this article.
Perhaps even more importantly, the Court implicitly holds that elec-
tive abortion is unconstitutional. It does so by indicating that the obliga-
tion to protect the fetus requires the State to make sure beforehand (by
means of a second medical opinion) that no abortions are done except
where the mother is truly threatened. The exact content of the Court re-
quirement is unimportant here. The point is this: If elective abortion
were permissible, there would be no constitutional life-related value in-
fringed upon even where an abortion were done outside the statutory pro-
visions. By insisting that these provisions be strictly enforced in order to
protect the unborn, the Court has clearly held the complete depenaliza-
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tion of abortion to be unconstitutional." As a fundamental public value,
developing human life cannot be converted into purely private property.
Not only did the Court manage to make this declaration in a case
where elective abortion was not even an issue, but it did so in a manner
highly likely to be acquiesced in by the government promoters of abortion
depenalization. It asked only for tiny, technical additions to the bill,
which were soon forthcoming. Had it done more, had it declared a
broader right to life, the government might well have refused to go along,
provoking a constitutional crisis."
The 1975 West German Constitutional Court decision on abortion
bears a striking resemblance to the 1985 Spanish ruling-not surprisingly
since, as mentioned previously, the former served in many ways as a
model for the latter.
Focusing upon the constitutional language "Everyone has the right to
life .... " (Jeder hat das Recht auf Leben... ).3s the German Court finds it
unnecessary to hold the unborn child to be a person, or a "bearer" of a
subjective right, 9 in order to include it within the protection of the Basic
Law. Note, however, that the Court does not shy away from referring to
the unborn's "right to life." It avoids only the question of whether the
child is the "bearer" (or "possessor") of this right. Perhaps the Court is
thinking of analogous positive constitutional welfare "rights" for adults
which need not necessarily give rise to individual claims presentable in a
court. To return to our hypothetical, a similar analysis would find that
bald eagles need not have civil law personality with access to courts in
38 The Spanish court may to a degree have been inspired by similar language in the 1975
Italian constitutional abortion decision, though the earlier phraseology would seem to ap-
pear in a procedural posture making it merely dictum: "[It] is the legislator's obligation...
to forbid the procuring of an abortion without careful ascertainment of the reality and grav-
ity of injury or danger which might happen to the mother as a result of the continuation of
pregnancy: Therefore the lawfulness of abortion must be anchored to a preceding evaluation
of the existence of the conditions which justify it." Carmosina, Corte Constituzionale, deci-
sion of 18 February 1975, No. 27 [1975] 20 giur. Const. 117 (as translated in CAPPELLET I &
COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 612-14 (1979)).
11 Alfonso Guerra, vice-president of the PSOE government, on 26 March 1985 (sixteen days
before the Court announced its decision) declared that if its law were ruled invalid, the
government would be forced to set up a "machinery for pardons" for those obtaining abor-
tions. The Court itself, he said, would be placed in "a socially difficult situation," and he
expressed regret that twelve non-elected persons should impede the will of 350 elected ones.
He went on to oppose the separation of powers, calling it a relic of the epoch of Montes-
quieu, and promised to reform the norms governing the Court. These statements placed the
justices under "intolerable pressure" according to the opposition parties. ABC, 12 abril
1985, at 53. The Court's elegant self-defense reminds one of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) Art. 2, Sec. 2, Sentence 1.
s' [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 41. For a full translation of the German decision, see Jonas &
Gorby, supra note 3, at 641-42.
32 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
order to receive constitutional protection. Both this right-to-life guaran-
tee and the explicit constitutional value of "human dignity"'40 leads the
Court to rule that all human life, including prenatal life, is part of the
"objective ordering of values" of the Basic Law.' Even the dissent agrees
that the State has a constitutional duty to protect unborn life, and indeed
states that the existence of this duty is "uncontested" (unbestrit-
ten)"'-arguing further, however, that the duty need not be implemented
by criminal sanctions.
The German decision is somewhat more "pro-life" in its reasoning
than the Spanish. Like the Spanish, it notes that human life is a contin-
uum, but unlike the Spanish it does not see "full human individuality"
occurring at birth. It states:
The process of development.., is a continuing process which exhibits no
sharp demarcation and does not allow a precise division of the various steps
of development of the human life. The process does not end even with birth;
the phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the human personal-
ity, for example, appear for the first time a rather long time after birth.
Therefore, the protection ... of the Basic Law cannot be limited either to
the "completed" human being after birth or to the child about to be born
which is independently capable of living.
43
Moreover, it specifically holds that the constitutional word "everyone" in-
cludes "everyone living"" and that no distinction can be made, with re-
gard to the right to life, between unborn and born life.45 Thus it could be
argued that in Germany the fetus is in all but name constitutionally a
person with rights, and so is closer than in Spain to being a full legal
bearer of subjective rights. Or, put another way, Germany is more indi-
vidualist and Spain more communitarian in their respective rationales for
4" Basic Law, Art. 1, Sec. 1, Sentence 1. Note that the Spanish constitutional equivalent
here (Art. 10, See. 1, Sentence 1) refers to "the dignity of the person," rather than to
"human dignity," and played only a minor role in the Madrid decision.
41 [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 41; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 642. For a further discussion,
see Gerstein & Lowry, supra note 4, at 862, 867, and materials cited therein.
" [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 68 (abweichende Meinung); Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 663
(dissent).
" [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 37; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 638. The Court appears to
reason that as long as we protect newborn infants, whose human development is signifi-
cantly incomplete, consistency requires protection prior to birth. Indeed, consistency re-
quires a theory of protection which either values organic human life itself or else values the
developing potentiality for higher "phenomena specific to the human personality"-for
these are the only sources of inherent value which the infant possesses at birth. In other
words, the Court argues that if we think newborns inherently worthy of protection, our
normative theories require us also to protect life even in the early weeks of pregnancy. For a
further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 63-72.
" [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 37; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 638.
46 [19751 39 BVerfGE 1, 37; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 638.
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deference to unborn life.Another way to understand the two decisions, however, would be to
note that both call the one to be born a "legal value" or a "legal good"
(Rechtsgut, bien juridico) rather than an individual possessing rights, al-
though the German language is stronger concerning the high rank of that
objective legal value. In both nations, unborn human life is an object
more than a subject of constitutional protection, is a public value of the
community rather than a private claim of the fetus or of the mother."'
The German Court's further concern with government teaching and coun-
seling in support of prenatal life also has a strongly communitarian ethos
behind it.47 The Court clearly hopes to build a common value commit-
ment rather than only a balance of individual interests.
The explicit result of such fetal value recognition in Germany, like
that implicit in Spain, is a holding that elective abortion is unconstitu-
tional, even in the first three months of gestation."' New life, the next
generation unborn, is the concern in some sense of the whole community,
not only of individual pregnant women. Nevertheless, as in Madrid, the
Court in Karlsruhe moderates the force of this conclusion by holding that
there are limits to what the community can ask individuals to contribute
to this common value, and that as a result laws may permit abortion in
various situations of relative hardship."' This individualist counterthrust
will be examined further below.
The 1973 U.S. Supreme Court abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, is in
surprisingly many ways similar to the Spanish and German decisions.
" But note that the German court, despite its use of value terminology, insists that such
value cannot be aggregated, that each particular life must be protected-even if the sacrifice
of some could lead to the preservation of a greater number. [19751 39 BVerfGE 1, 58-59;
Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 655-56. The refusal to aggregate is a departure from ordi-
nary valuing and is more at home in discourse informed by rights.
Are there ways to avoid the ruthlessness of valuing, its common callousness toward par-
ticulars, without appealing to the selfishness of rights? I believe there are in the ideas of
respect or reverence (which perhaps may be the deep grounds of the German decision). For
a further discussion, see Stith, Toward Freedom from Value, 38 THE JuRIST 48 (1978) (cri-
tique of valuing); Stith, Thinking about Ecology, XLV(1) THE CRESSET 7 (1981) (critique of
rights).
" [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 50, 57-58, 61-64; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 649, 651-55, 657-
60. For an excellent introduction to the German constitutional jurisprudence of values, see
Benda, New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 11 J. MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 1, 6-9 (1977). Dr. Benda at that time
was president of the Constitutional Court.
" [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 68; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 662-63.
" Very roughly speaking, the Court indicates that abortion need not be punished where the
mother's life or health is at stake, or she has been raped, or the child will suffer from a
serious health impairment, or she labors under some equivalent social hardship-inasmuch
as each of these situations may make a continuation of pregnancy not demandable by means
of the penal law. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 647-49.
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Like them, although much more strongly, it refuses to acknowledge con-
stitutional personhood or rights possessed by the unborn. 0 And just after
its finding of non-personhood, in a largely unnoticed portion of its deci-
sion, our Court creates a legal category very similar to that into which the
fetus is placed in those European opinions: non-personal human life.
That is, the U.S. Court indicates that its conclusion of non-personhood
does not yet dispose of the contention that there is a compelling state
interest in protecting life from the moment of conception. It does not
respond to this contention by arguing that there would be no decisive
state interest in protecting such non-personal life, should it exist, but
rather by indicating the Court's doubts as to whether the fetus is actually
human and alive in an extra-constitutional sense.5 ' Presumably, had the
Court been sure of the existence of a living human fetus, it would have
found a strong public concern for fetal protection, similar to that found
by the Spanish and German courts. In other words, the U.S. court creates
the same category (non-personal life imbued with a high public value)
brought forth by those other tribunals, but then fails to fill it.
It may well be this single difference, not a difference of constitutional
categories but a disagreement about the fact of actual human life, which
accounts for the tremendously disparate conclusions on abortion on the
two sides of the Atlantic. For it is not only Spain and Germany which
agree that human life exists prior to birth. The other four European con-
stitutional courts which have considered the matter appear to have
reached this same conclusion, 5 and none has subsequently seen fit to rec-
60 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973).
6" Id. at 159-62; see also infra note 53.
"' The cryptic French opinion (permitting the legislature to leave most early abortions un-
punished) contains the following phrase: "Considering that the law [permitting abortion]
referred to this Conseil Constitutionnel does not authorize any violation of the principle of
respect for every human being from the very commencement of life . . . except in case of
necessity." Decision of 15 January 1975, [1975] A.J.D.A. 134 (as translated in CAPPELLETI &
COHEN, supra note 36, at 577-78). For a different interpretation of the French decision, see
Glenn, The Constitutional Validity of Abortion Legislation: A Comparative Note, 21 Mc-
GILL L.J. 673, 677 (1975). The Italian decision referred to in supra note 36 observes that Art.
2 of the Constitution guarantees the inviolable rights of man, "among which must be placed,
although with the particular characteristics unique to it, the legal situation of the foetus
['concepito']," CAPPELLErrI & COHEN, supra note 36, at 613, and later emphasizes obligatory
protection for "the life of the foetus ['feto']," id. at 614, even while declaring that an embryo
is not yet a person, id. at 613, and that abortions for serious maternal health reasons must
be permitted. Corte Costituzionale, decision of 18 February 1973, n.27, [1975] 98 Foro It. I
(Giurusprudencia Costituzionale e Civile) 515, 516. Even the Austrian decision, which alone
holds that the fully elective abortion in the first three months of pregnancy is constitutional,
seems to concede "that throughout the whole duration of the pregnancy both the mother's
life and the nascent human life constitute constant life," stating that the legislature is con-
stitutionally free to protect the fetus by making abortion punishable, and is required to do
so after viability if post-natal infanticide is punishable. Decision of 11 October 1974, Consti-
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ognize a constitutional right to abortion in any way as sweeping as that of
Roe v. Wade. By and large, abortion has been left by them in the legisla-
tive domain.
Yet although the Roe majority does not consider the unborn child to
be human and alive, it holds that the fetus does have some public value,
not as life but as "potential life.""3 One might say that Europe considers
the unborn child to be a living human being, albeit only a potential legal
person, while the United States treats it as only a potential life. Never-
theless, there is some functional similarity to these two concepts, in that
both recognize the fetus to be a value worthy of public concern, as a "le-
gal good" and as a "state interest" respectively.
But let us not forget that the Spanish and German decisions did not
rest with the affirmation that the fetus is a "legal good." Those opinions
tied unborn life to the order of constitutional values, while Roe did not.
Perhaps the U.S. Court could have done otherwise. While our constitu-
tional doctrine does not acknowledge a full-blown hierarchy of values ap-
parent or hidden in our Constitution,54 the Supreme Court has gone be-
yond literal application of a set of unconnected rules. It has discerned the
value of "privacy," for example, albeit linking this value to individual
rights. Could our Court have looked at the various direct and indirect
references to life in our fundamental law in order to give at least some
tutional Court, [1974] Erklarungen des Verfassungsgerichtshofs 221, 234-35 G 8/74 (as
translated by CAPPELLETTI & COHEN, supra note 36, at 615, 620-21). The Portuguese deci-
sion of 19 March 1984 unanimously holds that the constitutional principle of the inviolabil-
ity of human life embraces "intrauterine human life," even though it goes on to declare a
limited disprotection of that life to be constitutional. 344 Boletin do Ministerio da Justica
197, 216, 230 (Mar. 1985). Thus, all four other European national decisions appear to recog-
nize actual rather than only potential human life in the unborn and to permit and even
require some measure of constitutional protection for that life, with the precise degree of
protection left largely up to the legislature. See generally REIS, DAs LEBENSRECHT DES UN-
GEBORENEN KINDES ALS VERFASSUNGSPROBLEM (1984).
Mary Ann Glendon's work, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987), surveys the
abortion laws of twenty Western nations and finds them all to be more sympathetic than
Roe to fetal life.
"s Roe calls the fetus "potential life," 410 U.S. at 150, 154, "prenatal life," id. at 151, 155,
"potential human life," id. at 159, "only the potentiality of life," id. at 162, "fetal life," id. at
163, and "the potentiality of human life," id. at 162, 164-the last referring to the period
after viability. It also states, "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life be-
gins," id. at 159, and "a legitimate state interest . . .need not stand or fall on the accept-
ance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some point prior to live birth," id. at
150. Putting all this together, one gathers that the Court does not know whether "life" (in
the sense of "human" life) exists prior to birth, but its potentiality does-in the form of
"prenatal" or "fetal" life.
But cf. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 744 if.
(1980) (Walter Murphy's attempt to construct such a system around the idea of "human
dignity"). See generally the works of Profs. Lawrence Tribe and Frank Michelman.
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attenuated constitutional status to what is called "potential life"? Or
would such a communitarian commitment to values be too alien to our
focus on rights? In any event, in portions of Europe prenatal life has be-
come something the State must respect, whereas in America it is only
something the State may respect, even in the last moments before birth."
Roe, then, treats the unborn as the object of no community commit-
ment at the constitutional level, and as only the optional object of such a
commitment at the legislative level. And even the latter option is sharply
limited. The state interest in potential life without constitutional status
fails entirely prior to viability, when confronted with a pregnant woman's
right to privacy." And even in the last period before birth, where the
state's interest is nominally "compelling, 5 7 it cannot compel much. Abor-
tions destructive of the fetus must be permitted, even just before birth, if
they promote what the Court calls "health"" but which it defines broadly
to include virtually every -significant reason a woman might have for a
third trimester abortion. 9 Donald Kommers, in contrasting the American
and German cases, has well described the outcome in our country:
A woman is thus entitled to separate herself from the community while the
community is rendered powerless to act in its common defense for the pur-
pose of safeguarding shared values.60
The Roe result mandating elective abortion virtually throughout
pregnancy could hardly be more at odds with the Spanish and German
decisions forbidding elective abortion even in early pregnancy. And that
result is likewise far from that reached by other European nations which,
" Even after viability, the fetus need be protected by the State only "[if] the State is inter-
ested in protecting fetal life," Roe, 410 U.S. at 163, and "if it chooses." Id. at 164-65.
" Prior to viability, abortion can be limited only in the interest of maternal health, not in
the interest of fetal life. Id. at 163-64.
6 Id.
" Id. at 165. The recent Supreme Court decision of Thornburgh v. A.C.O.G., 476 U.S. 747
(1986), reemphasizes that even after viability, there cannot be "any '"trade-off" between
the woman's health and additional percentage points for fetal survival.'" Id. at 769 (quoting
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979)).
" Roe's companion case, which should be "read together" with the former, see Roe, 410
U.S. at 165, defines "health" to be related to "all factors.., relevant to the well-being of the
patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). The Thornburgh Supreme Court opinion
does not refer to this definition, but the court of appeals did so in the decision under review.
The court of appeals' decision states: "It is clear from the Supreme Court cases that 'health'
is to be broadly defined. As the Court stated in Doe v. Bolton, the factors relating to health
include those that are 'physical, emotional, psychological, familial, [as well as] the woman's
age.'" 737 F.2d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Doe, 410 U.S. at 192). The court goes on to
say that a law which punished postviabiity abortions which were done to avoid the "poten-
tial psychological or emotional impact on the mother of the unborn child's survival" would
be clearly unconstitutional. Id.
" Kommers, Abortion and Constitution, supra note 4, at 282.
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given the very great but nonpersonal public value of prenatal life, leave
the matter of abortion almost entirely up to the legislature."1
How much likelihood is there that U.S. law on abortion might some-
day approach the mainstream of Western jurisprudence? Perhaps quite a
bit. Justice O'Connor's dissent in the 1983 Akron case indicates a desire
to find a compelling state interest in protecting the fetus throughout
pregnancy, though there is no evidence she would recognize constitutional
personhood prior to birth."2 If she were to ground her position not merely
on justices' sense of the weight of potentiality but on the fact and value of
actual life or of the constitutional dignity of even potential life, then the
two sides of the Atlantic would draw much nearer to each other.
CRITIQUE OF PRENATAL LIFE AS A LEGAL VALUE
Individual rights for fetuses are not the only alternative to individual
rights for pregnant women. Community concern for unborn human life
provides another way to look at the abortion problem, a way which I per-
sonally find superior."3 If you and I recognize someone's rights, we are not
bound by love to him or her, nor do we feel between ourselves a bond of
fellowship. By contrast, if we jointly commit ourselves to caring for an-
other, the basis is laid both for affection for the object of our concern and
for community among ourselves. The Spanish and German attitudes to-
ward the unborn are much closer than the official rights-based positions
of U.S. pro-lifers or pro-choicers to the actual feelings of parents for very
young children. Parents feel infants neither to be their private property
nor to be individuals negotiating their rights at arms' length. Instead and
for many years, a baby is the shared value of a common life.
Yet this new perspective does not answer the question of how great a
weight the child has before and after birth, in ordinary experience or in
the law. And here I submit there is an antinomy for which there may well
be no solution.
On the one hand, in early pregnancy, often the fetus is not sensed to
be present as a separate entity, and abortion is not felt to be a kind of
61 See supra note 52.
62 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459-66 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor reaffirmed her position, again in dissent, in
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814-33.
" Stith, A Critique of Abortion Rights, DEMOCRACY, Fall 1983, at 60; see Stith, A Critique
of Fairness, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 459 (1982) (broad attack on rights); see also R. Stith, Gener-
osity: A Duty Without a Right (paper presented to the Conference on Law and the Ordering
of Our Life Together, New York, April 1987) (further exploration of the nature of rightless
relations among persons). But cf. Stith, Toward Freedom from Value, supra note 46 (reser-
vations concerning the "value" approach to human dignity).
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homicide." On the other hand, a newborn infant is considered a human
being, and so is felt to possess what the German decision calls "inherent"
(selbtstandig) worth. 65 That is, the value of the newborn is perceived to
be inherent in its being, and not in the eyes of the parental or juridical
beholders.
How can these two perceptions be squared with each other? Obvi-
ously, by the assumption that the neonate is a different being from the
fetus. The change in being could be thought to come either from a quali-
tative biological leap or from the infusion of a spiritual soul, or from both.
Our modern quandary arises because we can no longer publicly affirm
either basis for this assumption of discontinuity in being.6 Human life,
according to modern science, is a continuum and, as the German court
notes, those traits (e.g., self-consciousness) for which many especially
value our species do not arise until quite some time after birth. Neither
can religion be the ground of a presumed change of being, in a pluralistic
or secular society.
Thus the belief in and commitment to the inherent value of life after
birth requires in our day (but did not require in that of our great-grand-
parents) significant protection for the child before birth67 -because our
law can no longer cogently proclaim that there is a difference in kind be-
tween the born and the unborn. To put the matter another way, if we as a
legislating community permit relatively casual abortion we have rendered
noncredible our commitment to the inherent value of every human being
even after birth.
Yet at the same time, as private individuals involved with early
pregnancies, we may continue not to feel the presence of another human
life. Consequently, abortion may seem morally permissible, and our main
concern with the law may not be getting caught.
There is one obvious way to cope with such dissonance: strong nomi-
nal legal protection for prenatal life coupled with large numbers of unlaw-
ful abortions.6" Other solutions, which grant the fetus some kind of inter-
" See Quintano Ripoll6s, supra note 2, at 503 (asserting that this is generally the case-at
least as of 1962, the year of that edition of his treatise).
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 67; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 662.
Justice Stevens' recent "pro-choice" concurrence in the Thornburgh case, 476 U.S. 747,
772-82 (1986), demonstrates both the importance and the futility of such a claim of disconti-
nuity. He there asserts that the permissibility of abortion hinges upon there being "a funda-
mental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being," but fails even to
hint at any grounds for such a distinction. Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" And indeed throughout pregnancy, according to the argument of the German court. See
supra note 43.
" The model of nominal illegality can be seen as a version of "excuse" reasoning on abor-
tion, which is discussed at greater length infra under the heading The Doctrine of "Too
Much to Demand." Guido Calabresi's works emphasize the frequent usefulness of a differ-
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mediate or compromise status, are trying to mix oil and water. They are
in harmony neither with the intuition that the newborn's value is great
and inherent nor with the intuition that early abortion concerns the preg-
nant woman alone.
A brilliant and influential article by Arroyo Zapatero, 9 which ap-
peared in Spain in 1980, attempts to cut this Gordian Knot. There he
proposes that concern for unborn life, wherever and to the extent it ex-
ists, be treated as a kind of cultural value of the community.70 Such life
would receive protection not for its own sake, but for the sake of the com-
munity which cares about it-in a manner reminiscent of Lord Devlin's
prohibition of homosexual activity in order to promote community moral
solidarity, 71 and of the common suggestion that we prevent cruelty to ani-
mals not to protect them but to protect human society's sensibilities. In
very early pregnancy, where such felt concern is minimal at best and im-
portant maternal rights are at stake, few if any prohibitions on abortion
would be appropriate. 2 Under Arroyo's approach, we need not seek to
harmonize pre- and post-natal intuitions about life, because only those
intuitions (and not life itself) are being valued.
Arroyo's solutions fails because we as legislators, as scholars, and as
judges are not ourselves outside the community. We are not simply con-
cerned with promoting some ethnic solidarity or sensibility which we do
not share. We are members of the community which values human life,
and as such are concerned with truly protecting that which we value-not
with affirming the value of our irrational valuing. Someone from Mars
might like us enough to want to preserve us in all our contradictory
splendor, but we ourselves feel compelled by honesty to find ways to re-
solve rather than to uphold our contradictions.
Our belief in inherent postnatal human worth cannot logically coexist
with lawful elective or nearly elective abortion, but neither can logic alone
induce women in distress to avoid abortion. Perhaps that belief will dis-
appear someday, or be pushed back to some point where a qualitative
change (rather than only a change in location, as at birth) takes place in
young human beings-say at self-consciousness, or at puberty. In that
ence between the law as ideal and the law in practice. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BE-
LIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 88 (1985) (contrasting the official prohibition of euthanasia
with actual jury practice).
'9 Arroyo Zapatero, supra note 34. The abortion decision of the Audencia de Bilabo of 24
March 1982 treats fetal life as a cultural value of the community. According to Santiago Mir
Puig, Aborto, estado de necesidad y Constitucion, 1982 REV. JUR. CATALUNA 1043, 1048 n.1,
this foundation for fetal protection entered Spain with Arroyo Zapatero's article and was
then picked up by the Bilbao court. For a further discussion, see supra note 35.
70 Arroyo Zapatero, supra note 34, at 209 ff.
"1 See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
72 Arroyo Zapatero, supra note 34, at 217 ff.
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case, we could hold to the inherent value of the latter new kind of being
but refuse to push that value forward to infantile or prenatal stages of
life. Or technical developments such as ultrasound may in effect create
windows in the womb, so that the intuition of inherent value can occur
and have a moral effect on pregnant women even in the early months of
pregnancy. But unless we evolve in one of these two ways, I cannot fore-
see a wholly satisfactory solution to the law's abortion dilemma.
THE DOCTRINE OF "Too MUCH TO DEMAND"
Life is a "superior," "fundamental," and "central" constitutional
value in Spain, and the fetus "embodies" this value. The government has
an affirmative duty to protect unborn life by means of criminal penalties
for its destruction. Yet the high court there goes on to permit abortion in
all the circumstances listed in the bill under review: grave danger to ma-
ternal life or health, rape, and likelihood of severe disability in the child.
How does the Court make such a turnaround?
One might have expected the Court, in line with its communitarian
perspective elsewhere, to look to the common good and to argue that the
protection of unborn life is not, or does not always result in, the highest
constitutional value. But it nowhere asserts that other values are more
important than fetal life. It mentions two theories by which the bill in
question may be justified: legislative choice between conflicting values
and the doctrine of non-demandability (L.F. 10). The latter, however, is
the only clear referent in most of the situations considered. The Court
appeals primarily to the idea that a continuation of pregnancy in such
circumstances is just too much for the criminal law to demand of an indi-
vidual. Even if such abortions do more harm than good to the values of
the community, the State need not punish them because there is a limit
to what individuals must sacrifice for constitutional values.
The doctrine of non-demandability in Spain has its origin in German
legal thought, where it was originally conceived as an extra-statutory de-
fense to crime from an individualist perspective."' It is felt in the Spanish
Penal Code in various ways, particularly in Article 8, to which the Court
specifically refers in its opinion.7" That article permits the defense of ne-
71 One of the earliest uses of this concept in criminal law occurred in the famous 1897
Leinenfanger decision of the Reichgericht. There the Court went beyond the penal code to
reason that although the omission in question "considering the common good ... could be
demanded of the actor," one must also ask whether it could be demanded of the accused
under the circumstances. 30 RGST 25-28, quoted in JIMiNEz DE ASUA, supra note 23, at 935.
' Article 8 of the Spanish Penal Code exempts various persons from criminal responsibility,
including the insane and infants. Section 4 adds an exemption for "one who acts in defense
of a person or rights, his own or alien (propios o ajenos)" as long as there has been illegiti-
mate aggression, rational choice of means, and lack of provocation. The key section 7 ex-
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cessity when an otherwise illegal act is done in order to avoid a greater or
an equal harm. The doctrine of non-demandability is thought by the
dominant opinion in Spain to account for the latter situation: 7
5 It is just
too much to demand of a person that he or she sacrifice a personal inter-
est simply for the sake of someone else's merely equal interest. A concrete
example of the influence of this doctrine is found in Article 18 of the
Penal Code, which exempts close family members from punishment for
harboring a fugitive. Again, one might say that the penal law just cannot
demand that a fugitive's spouse or parent refuse to take him or her in,
despite the general prohibition of such an act.7
As will become evident later, it is very important to understand
whether this doctrine is one of justification or of excuse. That is, does the
personal burden under which the defendant labors serve to make an oth-
erwise wrong act right, or does it only mean that the defendant is not to
be blamed (or even simply not to be punished) for the still wrongful act?
The dominant theory77 in Spain appears to treat the non-de-
mandability doctrine as one of excuse. Under such an approach, no one is
justified in preferring his or her own values, or own spouse, to the values
established by the community, but nevertheless such anti-social acts are
not punished where the subject in some sense could not act otherwise. An
act which is wrongful but nonpreventable, or at least not preventable by
means of the criminal law, is not to be punished. Note that if a mere
empts "one who, impelled by a state of necessity, in order to avoid an evil of his own or one
alien to him (meal propio o ajeno), injures a legal good (bien juridico) of another person,"
provided that the evil caused is not greater than that which he seeks to avoid, that he has
not intentionally provoked the situation of necessity, and that he does not have a special
obligation to sacrifice himself. Section 9 covers those who act under "irresistible force" and
section 10 those who act out of insuperable fear "of an equal or greater evil." Article 8 thus
incorporates ideas both of "excuse" (what might be called "necessity in the order of events")
and of "justification" (what might be called "necessity in the order of ideas").
Luis Jimenez de Asua considers fear and necessity under conflict of equal goods to be
excuses originating in the non-demandability idea. He adds other examples from the Span-
ish Penal Code, including the harboring of a fugitive by near relations (art. 18) and the
omission of non-demandable aid (art 489). 7 JIMANEZ DE AsOA, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL
196 (2d ed. 1977).
Some Spanish opinion also supports non-demandability as a legal excuse existing
outside the Penal Code. See, e.g., RICARDo DE ANGEL YANGUEZ, LEY DEL ABORTO 100-01
(1985).
Rodriguez Devesa, Derecho penal espanol, in PARTE GENERAL 556, 609-19 (1979).
76 The rationale for this defense is disputed, but the dominant opinion today appears to be
that non-demandability is its basis. See 6 JIMNENZ DE AsuA, supra note 23, at 1014; Rodri-
guez Devesa, supra note 75, at 618-19.
" Both 6 JIMiNEZ DE ASUA, supra note 23, at 932 ff. and Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 75,
at 609 if, treat non-demandability under the more general category of exculpation or non-
blameworthiness, i.e., as a kind of excuse rather than justification, and assert this to be the
dominant view.
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excuse for an act is involved, legitimate defense against the act remains
possible, and there are a number of other significant legal consequences
to be explored later.
On the other hand, there are some Spanish doctrinal considerations
which point to calling the non-demandability idea a justification.7" And it
can be argued that where no one, or no one except a hero, is in some
sense able to comply with a certain legal command, then acts or omissions
in violation of that norm lose their wrongful character even though they
do not avoid more harm than they cause. Furthermore, there are places in
Spanish law where a theory of non-demandability seems to have resulted
in a full statutory justification, in the sense of a legal certification of the
non-wrongfulness of the conduct in question. The penal law requirements
to stop crime (Art. 338 bis), to rescue (Art. 489 bis), and to give assistance
(Art. 586(2)) apply only where they can be observed without risk to the
actor or to a third party. Note that the omission of risky acts is here
justified, at least in the special sense that it is excluded from the defini-
tion (tipo) of these crimes, although Article 8 would not even excuse
it-for the actor is refusing to risk a slight personal interest at the cost of
greater harm to others. This contradiction can perhaps be overcome if we
cannot demand and expect public spirited actions to the degree to which
we exact public spirited omissions.
Legislators supporting the enactment of the new abortion statute ap-
pealed frequently to the non-demandability notion-often as an excuse.79
Likewise the government brief in the constitutional case is written as
'1 6 JIMiNEZ DE ASUA, supra note 23, at 967-69 (discussing some penalists who consider non-
demandability to be a justification). Rodriguez Devesa seems to use the non-demandability
notion as a general concept containing all justifications and exculpations, as well as using it
as a specific concept involving non-blameworthiness. See Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 75,
at 609-11.
Note that the mere fact that an objective balancing of values may be involved is not
necessarily a consideration leading us to classify non-demandability as justification. As
George Fletcher has pointed out, we expect people to be able to make greater sacrifices
when more is at stake. We may excuse someone who breaks another's leg under the threat of
losing his own, but not someone who blows up a city under the same threat. G. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 804 (1978).
"' The socialist Minister of Justice, Ledesma Bartret, argued on 25 February 1983 that the
non-demandability of continued pregnancy in certain circumstances is a cause of excuse
("inculpabilidad") for abortion. Bartret, supra note 6, at 17. On 25 May that year, Saenz
Coscullela, speaking "in the name of the Socialist Group," argued that the abortion bill does
not "legalize." Indeed, it expresses a "generic disapprobation" of abortion, while establish-
ing an "excuse" ("excusa") for therapeutic abortion, and refuses to blame ("inculpar")
abortions occurring where further pregnancy is not demandable. Diario de sessiones del
Congreso de los Diputados, II LEGISLATURE, No. 40, at 1850. Again on 4 October 1983, the
PSOE member Sotillo Marti argued, in favor of nonpunishment of some abortions, that
where other conduct is not demandable, an act lacks blameworthiness, i.e., is excused. Id.,
No. 61, at 2888.
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though the issue of non-demandability is one of whether or not a woman
having an abortion should be simply exculpated (i.e., excused) in the
specified situations."0 The only dissents which mention the matter in
some detail link the idea of non-demandability to that of legal excuse. 81
In some of the above arguments, however, there is an undercurrent of
justificatory reasoning."2 And on at least one occasion, spokespersons for
the proposed legislation clearly insisted that the abortions at issue were
to be treated as lawful, not simply unblameworthy 8 3
The Constitutional Court's own opinion, unfortunately, is far from
clear. Neither in its general discussion of non-demandability (L.F. 9) nor
in its specific applications of that idea (L.F. 11) does the Court label the
notion "excuse" or "justification." The opinion does not, however, explic-
itly treat any abortion as justified in the sense that it is the best solution,
the one which maximizes net resultant value. Except in the Court's treat-
ment of abortion to save the mother's life and perhaps to avoid grave
danger to her health (where it may possibly be treating the child as an
aggressor against whom the mother has a right of self-defense (L.F.
11(a)), the Court looks overtly to the idea (and only to the idea) that
some pregnancy continuations are too much to demand of a woman. In
considering rape pregnancies, the Court lists the constitutionally recog-
nized values of the woman which have been harmed by that act of vio-
lence. But it does not suggest that denying her an abortion would have a
further overall negative effect on the values at stake. Instead, it reasons
that obligating her to put up with the consequences of rape is not de-
mandable (L.F. 11(b)). In the case of abortion for probable grave disabili-
ties in the child, the Court is even more straightforward. The basis for
non-punishment of such abortions, according to the Court, is that to re-
quire continuation of pregnancy would be an imposition on the mother
beyond that which is normally demandable. That parents put up with the
inevitable insecurity attending such a pregnancy is too much to demand.
It is hard even to imagine that avoiding such parental anxiety is constitu-
SO BJC, supra note 5, at 529-30.
" Francisco Tomis y Valiente insists that the abortion bill contains neither a legalization
nor a depenalization of abortion, but simply a declaration of non-punishment in certain
situations, while maintaining intact the definition of the crime ("manteniendo intacto el tipo
delictivo"). A judge, not a physician, thus should decide when those situational require-
ments have been met, since the acts regulated by article 417 continue being criminal ("con-
tinuan siendo delictivas"). He adds, however, that the basic rule prohibiting abortion ap-
pears to him of doubtful constitutionality. BJC, supra note 5, at 539; see also Arozamena
Sierra, in BJC, supra note 5, at 537 (less clear linkage of nonculpability and excuse).
82 Arozamena Sierra, supra note 81, at 537; see also Sotillo Marti, supra note 79; BJC,
supra note 5, at 529-30 (government brief).
82 So argued bill supporters Lopez Riano and Sotillo Marti on 7 September 1983. See supra
note 33, at 2121, 2140-41.
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tionally a fundamental value equal to life in Spanish law, so that the
Court could in any event appeal only to non-demandability in order to
uphold this portion of the law in question (L.F. 11(c)). s4
Once again, the often unspoken background for all these Spanish ar-
guments is German legal theory. It was in Germany that the idea of non-
demandability first arose doctrinally."5 It is there used to explain code-
based "excusing necessity," which is structured differently from the ne-
cessity defense in Spain."8 The German abortion depenalization statute
itself permitted post-twelve-week-gestation abortion where there was a
danger to maternal life or health or of serious fetal defect such that no
alternative to abortion could be demanded (zumutbar and verlangt re-
spectively).8 7 Not surprisingly, the West German Constitutional Court
likewise uses the non-demandability doctrine to deal with abortion. The
Court indeed appears to base its approval of hardship-case abortions ex-
clusively upon this idea-even where continued pregnancy would
threaten a woman's own life or health.8 It applies the doctrine without
further argument to the case of potentially grave disability abortions
(which the Court calls "eugenic" abortions) 9 and to "social" abortions
involving equivalent hardship because of the woman's life context. Unfor-
tunately, the Court sends mixed signals on the issue of whether non-de-
8 Despite the Constitution's explicit directive, found in article 49, that the State protect
the disabled, the Court does not discuss the possible repercussions which the legalization of
such abortions may have on future public and parental attitudes and actions with regard to
those born with severe handicaps-but then this point is likewise ignored in the briefs. For
research indicating a negative impact, see G. FLETCHEI, ATrITUDES ToWARD DEFECTIVE
NEWBORNS 21 (2(1) Hastings Center Studies Jan. 1974).
Nor does the Court anywhere suggest the now commonplace notion that life with severe
disabilities may have relatively little value or even be a disvalue. Such a suggestion would
obviously go a long way toward tipping the scales in favor of parental interests.
" For a discussion of the nature and the context of the German (and, indirectly, the Span-
ish) concept of "Unzumutbarkeit," see G. FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 833 ff.; Eser, Justifi-
cation and Excuse, 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1976); see also JIM.NEZ DE AsUA, supra note 23,
at 930 ff.
" The German Penal Code separates necessity (Notstand) into two articles, 34 and 35, and
titles the first "Justifying Necessity" and the second "Excusing Necessity." According to the
latter, certain persons are excused when they must act illegally to avoid a danger to life,
limb, or liberty, unless they could have been expected (demanded, "zugemutet") to accept
the risk involved. See, e.g., DREHER & TRONDLE, STRAFGESETZBUCH 188, 196 (42d ed. 1985).
87 The actual statute was somewhat more complex than this summary. See [1975] 39
BVerfGE 1, 4-6; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 611-12.
" [19751 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 647-48; see also supra note
49.
89 [19751 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 647-48 (indicating approval
of earlier governmental arguments in favor of non-punishment of disability and rape-based
abortions).
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mandability makes all these abortions justified or merely excused."0
Spanish commentary upon the German constitutional settlement,
prior to Spain's own proposed law reform, was generally critical. Com-
mentators both opposing 1 and favoring" extensive abortion rights had
difficulty understanding how non-demandability could permit abortion in
the face of the German high court's strong affirmation of the duty of the
State to protect unborn life. At most, it was argued, the Court's reasoning
would lead to excusing such abortions, not to justifying them.
United States criminal law does not contain an explicit defense of
non-demandability. Our "duress" or "coercion" defense, which is gener-
ally considered an excuse, is perhaps its closest analogue, but that defense
is more limited than the Spanish Article 8 or German "excusing neces-
sity."9' It could not apply to abortion because no one is threatening harm
to the mother unless she ends her pregnancy. There exists for us no com-
prehensive penal or constitutional principle which ensures that no one is
punished for doing an act whenever not doing the act is "too much to
demand."
Despite our restricted theory of excuses, however, it could be argued
that something like non-demandability pervades our law, and does so
often in the form of justification. After all, except in Vermont, we do not
require rescues of strangers in the first place, not even where they involve
no risk whatsoever. It has been suggested that it is too restrictive to im-
pose on everyone that they be good samaritans."4 Again, we sometimes
permit a violent response to aggression, even where retreat is possible,
and especially where retreat would involve some risk.95 Are we perhaps
saying that it is too much to ask victims that they act against their own
interests in order to protect the interests of aggressors, even when the net
harm caused by resistance is much greater than that caused by retreat?
" For example, the Court indicates that even where abortion is not punished, the State is
expected to remind a woman of her "fundamental duty (Pflicht) to respect the right to life
of the unborn, to encourage her to continue the pregnancy." [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50;
Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 647-48. Yet the Court later insists that the law distinguish
the justified (gerechtfertigt) cases of abortion from the reprehensible (verwerflich) ones.
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 58; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, at 654-55. Sorting out these remarks
in light of the basic principles governing the decision, the Dreher & Tr6ndle commentary
concludes that the Constitutional Court's decision points in the direction of an excuse un-
derstanding. DREHER & TRONDLE, supra note 86, prenote 9 to § 218, at 999-1000.
" Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 25, at 99. Rodriguez Devesa later joined in the book EN
DEFENSA DE LA VIDA, supra note 35, opposing the abortion depenalization bill.
" Arroyo Zapatero, supra note 34, at 205.
" Supra note 86. The German penal article 35 is limited to excusing those who protect
themselves or those near to them. But there remains some support for non-demandability as
an extrastatutory defense.
G. CALABRESI, supra note 68, at 102-03 (reporting and disagreeing with this sentiment).
" See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1985).
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Roe v. Wade obviously did not need to draw upon anything like the
above lines of reasoning; its constitutional value in the unborn child
meant that it did not have to search for justification or excuse for abor-
tion beyond the right of privacy. But there have been a number of schol-
ars who have sought to justify the result in Roe, elective abortion, by ap-
pealing to our alleged tradition of "bad samaritanism."'' The explicit
thrust of these arguments is that even if the fetus were recognized to be a
living human being, and even if it were seen to be a person possessing a
constitutional right to life, elective abortion would be permissible because
our law does not generally require individuals to aid others at substantial
cost to themselves. Though I have not found these thoughts to coalesce
around precisely the non-demandability doctrine of Europe, surely some-
thing similar is at work here. If elsewhere we are individualists believing
in laissez faire and laissez mourir, it must seem to many of us "too much
to demand" of a pregnant woman that she alone make great sacrifices-a
point to which I return at the end of this commentary.
CRITIQUE OF THE "Too MUCH TO DEMAND" DOCTRINE
There are three final points I would like to make at some length. The
first is that the concept of non-demandability, even if accepted as a start-
ing point for legal reasoning, is incapable of doing what its adherents
want it to do; namely, giving at least some abortions the full support of
the law. The second is that non-demandability is in fact unacceptable as
a first principle of reason, for it obscures as much as it reveals. The third
is that, despite its deficiencies, the doctrine remains extremely useful to
show that the abortion dilemma is merely one manifestation of the ten-
sion between community and individual and that a solution to the di-
lemma depends, therefore, on a relaxation of the tension.
As we have seen, there are two ways to understand Spanish (and
German) constitutional law on abortion-that the legislature may treat
some abortions as excused or that it may treat them as justified. My argu-
ment is that under both hypotheses a tension results in the law, but only
in the latter case does it approach a contradiction.
The first hypothesis-excuse-seems to me the most plausible inter-
pretation of the Spanish court's opinion. The doctrine of non-de-
mandability is ordinarily treated in Spain 97 and in Germany 8s as one in-
volving excuse. Given both courts' refusal to affirm that the unborn child
See, e.g., Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MCH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); Thompson, A
Defense of Abortion, 1 PHEL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
' See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
" Eser, supra note 85, at 627, 637. This essay is also a useful introduction to the basic
structure of German (and of much of Spanish) penal theory.
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has substantially less legal value than the mother, it is hard to see how
any abortion (except, perhaps, for the mother's life) could be justified
without at least a great deal of argumentation, which is left unsupplied' 9
Moreover, the Spanish law in question bears a stronger resemblance to
Penal Code 'Article 18 (excusing family members who harbor a fugitive)
than it does to Article 489 bis (declaring a duty to rescue only where
there is no risk to oneself). Like the former and unlike the latter, the
abortion depenalization law does not expressly alter the definition (type)
of the crime but only precludes the imposition of punishment in certain
cases. This difference, I think, should be understood to be one of excuse
versus justification, as has been argued.
As excuse, non-demandability can be given a fairly precise meaning.
Penalties are set according to what is ordinarily necessary for deterrence
and must not be excessive in proportion to ultimate culpability. But then
persons having to make unusually high sacrifices in order to comply with
the law cannot be compelled to do so. Such persons are arguably both less
culpable (because the net harm caused by the excused offense is less than
that caused by an ordinary offense where no harm is at the same time
avoided) and less deterrable (because again of the unusual personal harm
resulting from failure to commit the offense). Thus, within the limits set
by proportionality (L.F. 10), there may be no penalty adequate to deter
individuals from acts necessary to avoid great personal hardship. Without
an adequate deterrent motive, the "ideal type" rational self-interested in-
dividual may be literally unable to comply with the law. And where the
threat of punishment can serve no purpose, it should not even be made.
Acts involving great and unusual hardship cannot be exacted'"0 by ex
post facto penalties and should, therefore, be excused by law-even if
those acts have a net negative effect on public values.
Excuse fits better than justification into the communitarian ethos of
the Spanish decision. It is perhaps not logically inconsistent, but it cer-
tainly would be a shift in ideology for a court one moment to emphasize
duties to pursue common values and the next moment to declare individ-
uals to be legally justified in destroying those values. By contrast, there
would be nothing strange about a fully developed socialist jurisprudence
recognizing that human beings are not (or at least not yet) so constituted
as to be able in all circumstances to give the same weight to others' inter-
ests as they do to their own. Where this is the case, proportionate punish-
ment may serve little purpose. The penal law, at least, should excuse such
"See generally DREHER & TRONDLE, supra note 86.
'o "Exactability" is the word used by Jonas & Gorby, supra note 3, to translate
Zumutbarkeit. I have ordinarily preferred "demandability" because of its greater normative
resonance in English, but here the more physically coercive feeling of the word "exacted"
captures the point better.
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unjustified self-preference.
But, for a number of reasons excuse thinking alone cannot fully legal-
ize abortion. Excuse is considered to apply only to the person so bur-
dened that he or she is unable to act rightly toward the fetus. It is not
thought to apply to third parties. Specifically, it would seem not to apply
to the doctor performing the abortion any more than the excuse of duress
applies to bystanders who help a threatened person carry out some diffi-
cult crime. The government's strongest argument in favor of its statute,
non-demandability as excuse, makes little sense, for that statute clearly
exempts from punishment all parties to certain abortions, not just the
mother. The difficulty of excusing the aborting physician had been no-
ticed already in 1982, in a quite cogent Spanish law journal article.0 1 If
the anti-abortion brief had contained more than its one exceedingly short
reference to this point, 102 perhaps the Court would not entirely have over-
looked this stumbling block in its lengthy summary of the arguments.
At this time, of course, the non-punishment of the doctor has been
approved. That is the Court's holding, regardless of whether or how that
conclusion is supported by its reasoning (at least until fuller argument
leads it to a different conclusion). The principle of legality, the principle
of non-punishment without a prior statutory violation, would seem to
preclude any penalty for a physician doing an abortion in one of the spec-
ified circumstances. But this does not entirely dispose of our problem. If
abortion is only excused rather than justified under penal law, what is its
status in civil law? 08 For example, could a father sue for damages be-
cause his unborn child has been aborted? (Or could he sue a physician for
negligently failing to abort his handicapped infant?) Must, or even may,
State social insurance programs pay for the commission of acts still con-
sidered unlawful? And what is the legal status of a contract to deliver
abortifacients if abortion remains legally unjustified?"0
10 Cerezo Mir, supra note 31.
10 Petitioners' supplementary brief of 3 January 1983 [sic] at 16.
108 The Spanish court opinion, in L.F. 14, explicitly avoids resolving the civil law issues
raised by the non-punishment of abortion. BJC, supra note 5, at 536. (Not all the issues I
here raise were, however, brought forward in petitioners' briefs). See Rodriguez Devesa,
supra note 75, at 557, 616 (pointing out that civil responsibility remains for excused crimi-
nal acts); see also 7 JIMENEZ DE AsUA, supra note 74, at 201-02. Jonas & Gorby, in their
commentary, see supra note 3, at 591-92, raise the possibility of civil suits in Germany, and
the Dreher & Trndle discussion, see supra note 86, makes clear that the legitimacy of
social insurance payments for unpunished but possibly still unlawful abortions is a live issue
in Germany. For an excellent survey and argument, concluding that abortion remains illicit
and therefore cannot be a duty in civil law, see Kluth, Zur Rechtsnatur der indizierten
Abtreibung, 5 Z.F.GES.FAMR 440 (1985).
,o4 See Spanish Civil Code art. 1275 (depriving contracts for an illicit cause of any effect).
An illicit cause is defined to be one opposed to laws or morals. Cf. German Civil Code art.
134.
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Even more significantly, if abortion remains always wrongful albeit
excused, could not third parties intervene to stop abortion of develop-
mentally disabled fetuses, especially if they did so in some minimally in-
trusive non-violent way? The necessity defense in the United States has
not been very successful in preventing the conviction of those who sit in
abortion clinics, 05 but Spanish law looks very different. Article 8's idea of
necessity (preservation of the greater legal value) could be appealed to.
Non-violent intervenors could argue "legitimate defense"-just as a bank
teller can defend himself or an associate against a robber acting non-cul-
pably under duress. 106 Most precisely on point may be that in Spain a
,05 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); Gaetano
v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 1979); People v. Krizka, 92 M1l. App. 3d 288, 416
N.E.2d 36 (1980); Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d 483
(1983); City of St. Louis v. Kocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. App. 1982). These post-Roe lower
courts have generally refused even to listen to necessity arguments concerning the fact and
value of prenatal life. Their opinions are fascinating in light of the constitutional models
developed earlier in this Article. One might have thought that American courts would con-
strue Roe's constitutional right to an abortion to be soley a rule against state intervention,
particularly after the Harris and Maher cases. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1977);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Private intervention in abortion clinics (to protect what
proffered evidence supposedly would show to be human life with significant ethical, statu-
tory, or common law value) would remain unaffected by Roe and so possibly justified. But in
fact virtually all lower court opinions treat Roe as imposing a negative value judgment, in
regard to the fetus, on the whole legal order, quite analogous to the positive value imposed
in Spain and Germany. The analogy is close: In those European nations the mandated high
value of fetal life requires the State to punish conduct which destroys the fetus. In the U.S.
the mandated low value of fetal life requires the State not to refrain from punishing con-
duct which prevents fetal destruction.
It could be argued that some of these lower courts have disallowed the necessity defense
simply to prevent disorder at abortion clinics, without any sense of constitutional mandate.
But the bare possibility of acquittal under necessity might not significantly increase the
number of sitters willing to be arrested at abortion clinics. And even if clinic chaos were to
result, a quick fix might be had in the form of a legislatively imposed abortion exception to
the necessity defense. Judicial imposition of such an exception would not be required.
," Both Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 75, at 557, 616 and 7 JIMENEZ DE AsUA, supra note
74, at 201-02, make clear that forcible defense is legitimate against acts which are merely
excused. The former specifically applies this principle to the law excusing a parent who
harbors a fugitive. Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 75, at 619. The explicit wording of article
8(4), referring to the defense "of the person or [of] rights" might not apply to the defense of
the "legal good" of unborn life, but article 8(7) would seem to offer obvious support for
abortion clinic interventions. The latter permits actions against personal goods in order to
avoid any "alien" evil. See supra note 74. Of course, there would also have to be a weighing
of the harm caused by the intervention against the value of any fetal life saved. In Spain
this calculus is ordinarily based upon a comparison of the usual criminal penalties for, say,
trespass and abortion. Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 75, at 546. The result of the balancing
might well vary depending upon the means and consequences of the sit-in.
The wording of the German Penal Code is even more favorable to such defenses. In
addition to the necessity arguments of articles 34 and 35 of the Penal Code, supra note 86,
articles 32 and 33 would seem to provide another justification and excuse argument for non-
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person is justified in preventing another from destroying something of his
or her own which has social utility." 7
Nor are these arguments merely technical or sophistic. It is clearly
one thing to say that someone does not deserve punishment for an act
because she could not be expected to behave otherwise, and quite another
for the State to support or even to not prevent that act. Remember that
non-demandability is a penal law doctrine; there are some things which
are supposedly too much to demand by means of ex post facto penalties.
The Spanish Court's own discussion of non-demandability theory (L.F.
10) emphasizes that penal punishment for failure to comply with a legal
norm is sometimes "totally unsuitable," which does not entail that the
norm itself is to be called into question. The Court also points out that
the State's duty to protect the legal good of life continues to subsist in
other areas. If the State allows civil suits against abortionists, denies in-
surance coverage, does not recognize contracts, and does not punish sit-
ins in abortion clinics or the equivalent, it is not imposing punishment on
women who have had abortions. There is nothing incoherent in a legal
system which makes all abortions illegal, but excuses some women who
have them with the thought that compliance with the law is too much to
demand of persons in great distress. To the contrary, a system would be
incoherent which punished justified acts (e.g., sit-ins)108 in order to fur-
ther excused ones (i.e., abortions).
That this is the present state of Spanish law is implied by a number
of sources. Proponents of abortion depenalization, and at least one of the
high court dissenters, argued that abortions were not being "legalized," as
has been pointed out above.1"9 Opponents of abortion now read the Court
decision to say that abortion has not become "licit."11 If such statements
violent clinic interventions. These Notwehr defenses are available to those who act to pro-
tect "another" against an unlawful attack, and the German court decision seems potentially
open to an interpretation of the unborn child as "another." See supra notes 38-46 and ac-
companying text.
107 Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 75, at 554.
108 If non-violent clinic intervention were futile (in the sense that women wishing abortions
will invariably simply postpone them if a particular clinic becomes unavailable for a time),
the necessity justification for sit-ins would lose much of its force. But the mere fact that
pregnancy continuation is too much to demand by means of a posteriori punishment does
not, without more, prove that prior intervention to close clinics or to dissuade women might
not be effective and normatively called for. Surely a legal system could appropriately abolish
penalties for some or all (attempted) suicides, under non-demandability excuse thinking,
without entailing the abolition of defenses to battery for those who intervene to prevent
suicides.
100 See supra notes 79, 81. But cf. supra note 83.
11 So argues Federico Trillo-Figueroa in his early unpublished response to the Court enti-
tled "En defensa de Ia Vida" (the same title as that of the pre-decision book referred to
supra note 35 and to which he contributed). The anti-abortion commentary LEY .DEL
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mean anything, they indicate a legal situation very close to that which
has been described and very far from a legal right to abortion.
Can a case be made for a contrary interpretation of the Spanish deci-
sion, that it declares non-demandable abortions to be not excusable but
justifiable and that the statute upheld is in fact one of justification? The
most obvious argument in favor of this interpretation is not a legal but a
political one. There might be little point in bringing about a legal situa-
tion which keeps women out of jail but which may well have very little
effect on the actual availability of abortion. If abortion remains wholly
illicit, clinics will be under burdens so great that they may find it unprof-
itable to operate. But an attempt at legal argumentation can also be
made: Excuse reasoning is hard put to explain the Court's approval of the
non-punishment of the aborting physician."1 And the analogy of abortion
law to fugitive law is not perfect. In the latter case, only certain actors
(i.e., family members) are declared exempt from punishment. In the for-
mer, the act itself of abortion is declared non-punishable. From the point
of view of penal law, what can be made of a norm without a penalty?
Perhaps the definition (type) of the crime of abortion has in effect been
cut back after all, though not by the direct wording used in the Penal
Code's Article 489 bis requiring rescue. 1
There is an undeniable appeal in the justification interpretation on
non-demandability. Always to value the interests of others equally with
one's own is a heroic or saintly ideal. To demand compliance with this
ideal would clearly often be too much-whence the argument for excuse.
But even to ask for heroic behavior may seem uncalled for. Don't we have
a right not to be heroes, without incurring legal disapprobation? Quite a
ABORTO, supra note 74, at 91 ff., 327, also asserts and implies the continuing illicitude of
almost all abortions.
,1' The Dreher & Trondle commentary, however, has little problem treating the physician's
exemption as based upon separable public health grounds. That is, in order for excused
abortions to be performed in safety, physicians are permitted to perform them, without
implying that the law favors or is even neutral on the question of whether abortions should
occur. Supra note 86, prenote 9e to art. 218, at 1001-02. Spanish law has a similar catch-all
category of excuse, called the excusa absolutoria, which the law could use to understand the
status of the aborting physician. See 6, 7 JIMENEZ DE ASUA, supra notes 23 & 74. But cf.
NATHANSON, ABORTING AMERICA 193-94 (1979) (arguing that the advent of modern antibiot-
ics, of the plastic suction curette, and of self-abortive drugs makes illegal abortion no longer
a major public health problem even if the medical abortionist is held penally accountable).
"' Despite its own conclusion that abortion is only excused, the Dreher & Trondle commen-
tary, supra note 86, makes clear that the dominant legal opinion in Germany is that non-
punished abortions are to be considered justified. See generally Eser, Reform of German
Abortion Law: First Experiences, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 375 n.40 (1986); GROPP, DER
STRAFIOSE SCHWANGERSCHAFTSABaRUCH (1981). The latter's arguments virtually ignore the
need to integrate penal and constitutional theory, however, while the Dreher & Trondle
argument is built upon an attempt at such integration.
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few spokespersons for abortion reform made just such an appeal, saying
that to bear a child after rape or one likely to be gravely disabled is to be
heroic, not just law-abiding. Analogies were made to self-defense law,
which gives the victim's interest priority over that of the aggressor, and to
the legal permission not to rescue others where any personal risk is in-
volved.1 1 3 In those situations, too, the law recognizes an apparent right
not to sacrifice one's own lesser interests for the sake of other's greater
interests. The communitarian principles of the necessity defense here give
way to a deep individualism.
Such a politico-legal theory is quite evidently not in harmony with a
spirit of dedication to common goals. Instead, it would seem to be
founded on something like social contract reasoning. People with essen-
tially private interests come together out of a limited need for mutual
defense and cooperation. They agree to accept a certain burden, but no
more, for the sake of their joint enterprise. Once they have made the
maximum expected contribution, they have a right to refuse further pay-
ments. Where an act or omission is necessary in order to avoid an excess
contribution to public values, that act or omission is legally justified.
It is a strange beast, this hybrid of Social State and social contract.
From the point of view of community values, the act or omission is wrong.
It results in a net value loss. Yet from the point of view of the individual,
the act is right. The non-hero reasons that one should not have to give to
the community anything more than one thinks one is likely to need from
the community. Since he or she is certainly never going to be a fetus in
need of maternal support, why should he or she feel obligated to give
such support?1 1
The idea of non-demandability can in this way be thought to justify
abortion (particularly in circumstances of unusual hardship) despite the
11 On 25 May 1983, in the Congress of Deputies, the PSOE spokesperson Saenz Cosculluela
argued that the law values one's own life more than that of another, and that the law cannot
demand heroism of a pregnant woman. See supra note 79, at 1853-54. On 7 September 1983,
Sotillo Marti argued for the abortion depenalization bill by appealing to the fact that the
law does not always demand that we rescue others, even though it may be our moral duty to
do so. Again on 5 October 1983, he argued that to require the continuation of pregnancy in
the hardship conditions covered by the proposed law would be to demand heroism, which
the Penal Code does not do when it comes to rescue. See Diario de Sesiones del Congreso,
supra note 31, at 2946; Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Disputados, supra note 33,
at 2138.
Cf. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 871 (1976) (important attempt to understand the interaction of the values of propor-
tionality and autonomy).
11 Someone who thinks in this way puzzlingly overlooks the fact that he or she has already
needed and received aid as a fetus. Yet such analysis appears dominant in the decisions in
question. Nowhere is the duty to support new life treated in these cases as a matter of
simple reciprocity for benefits everyone has earlier received.
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fact that the values of the community, the values for the sake of which we
have come together, thereby suffer. Abortion is somehow justified and not
justified at the same time. The community permits abortions without say-
ing that abortions ought to occur.
What legal concepts can express the permission to be non-heroic-in
regard to abortion or to non-rescue or to other analogous situations?
Surely not "claim" and "duty." The fact that someone violates no legal
duty in refusing to maximize the common good of life does not mean that
others violate a legal duty in striving by means other than penal law to
further that good. In other words, any Spanish (or German) permission to
abort should be labeled a "liberty""' 5 rather than a "right." The State
does not insist sub poena that a pregnancy continue, but neither may a
pregnant woman insist upon support or protection for abortion. In this
view, abortion would be objectively legal, not only excused, but it would
be legalized only as a liberty and not as a claim upon the community.
Such an understanding is similar to an old way of looking at the legal
situation called "necessity"-that it returns all parties involved to a
"state of nature," where legal duties and claims in the full sense do not
yet exist.11
6
But if abortion is only a liberty, involves only the absence of penal
prohibition, necessity doctrine might still justify intervention to prevent
abortions." Necessity always involves individual interference with what
are otherwise legal rights of others. Even where one is not legally required
to furnish his coat to a freezing child, the child may be excused and even
justified in taking it. Or, better, suppose a nonswimmer bystander to be
watching helplessly as an unknown child lies drowning at the bottom of
the pool. A good swimmer walks by but refuses to help because he already
has a cold and does not wish to risk making it worse. The bystander
blocks the swimmer and grabs his hat, telling him he will not get it back
unless he rescues the child. Would a court convict the nonswimmer of
battery or of theft? I suspect not. Thus even assuming arguendo that we
think the swimmer legally justified in refusing to help, we may also think
the nonswimmer justified in forcing him to help. That we do not use the
criminal law to coerce people into making sacrifices does not mean that
we do not wish such sacrifices to be made, nor that we are willing to use
criminal penalties to ensure that no sacrifices are made. If pregnancy is
only like rescuing, and both are just sometimes too much to demand by
"' The reference here is to the concept which Hohfeld calls "privilege." See generally W.
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
... See Rodriguez Devesa, supra note 75, at 555.
... Civil damages for abortion might still be recoverable by a father. Even an act that is
justified under penal law may incur liability for civil damages. See Penal Code art. 20 and
the commentaries thereon by 7 JIMENEZ DE AS6A, supra note 74, at 198-99.
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means of criminal penalties, then abortion has not yet won the full sup-
port of the law. Particularly under a jurisprudence of "effective" commu-
nity values, it would seem that courts ought to ignore rules wherever acts
further the greater constitutional value. And, at least in the case of abor-
tion to avoid bearing a disabled child, it would be very hard for a Spanish
tribunal to find that prevention of such an abortion, by means of non-
delivery of abortifacients or of a non-violent sit-in, is not in accord with
the constitutional order of values. On the side of the fetus are the values
of life and of protection for the handicapped, while the Court mentions
no constitutional value at all on the side of abortion.
The theoretical and practical disadvantages of the conclusion reached
here are obvious. Abortion, even if fully legal in the sense that non-rescue
in the face of risks is fully legal, may still not become easily availa-
ble-because non-cooperation with, and even intervention against, the
performance of abortion may be justified by the thinking at the base of
the necessity defense. Conceptual and public order may thereby be
threatened. These disadvantages do not often arise in the parallel case of
non-rescue, because not rescuing another does not ordinarily require the
participation of third parties, nor does the intervention of third parties
normally preclude not rescuing. By contrast, abortion necessarily impli-
cates third parties and the judicial system which judges those parties.
If the idea of non-demandability were limited to excusing women
who undergo abortions, it would lead to no such anomalous results and
would probably find near universal support. Most states in the U.S., for
example, de facto and even de jure,"s did not punish women for abortion
prior to Roe v. Wade. But they did prosecute abortionists. The values of
life and order are compatible with excuses which are truly and merely
excuses, with the desire not to use penal law against women, but not with
more.
Alternatively, we can hold to a justificatory sense of the non-de-
mandability of bearing a child, letting it mean community support for a
right not to make undue sacrifices. But we can do so in an orderly fashion
only at the cost of devaluing human life (or of somehow honestly separat-
ing fetal' life from postnatal life). If unborn life has little value, abortion
does little if any damage, and so contracts for it should be enforced and
no one is justified in preventing it.
In other words, either abortion must remain a crime (though one for
which many or even all women need not be punished), or it must be seen
to promote the common good (because unborn human life hardly counts
as part of that good). Only these two solutions are internally coherent in
"1 See WOHLERS, WOMEN AND ABORTION (published undated, American Center for
Bioethics) (surveying pre-Roe statutory and case law and concluding that women were al-
most always exempted from punishment by one or the other).
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theory and practice.
Is the doctrine of non-demandability the best place to begin to think
about which solution to seek? A good argument can be made that this
doctrine is not a very helpful starting point (anywhere in the world) be-
cause it is likely one-sidedly to obscure as much as it reveals of the legally
significant dimensions of pregnancy and of abortion.
To ask whether a continuation of pregnancy in certain circumstances
is demandable of a woman is to emphasize exclusively the affirmative and
sacrificial character of pregnancy. In other words, it makes us think of
pregnancy as an act of giving and of abortion as an omission or a ceasing
so to give. But surely in many ways abortion is an act by the mother or by
her agent, and continued pregnancy is an omission. Somehow this makes
a difference. It is often worse legally, if not morally, to throw someone
who has slipped into one's home out into the freezing cold than not to let
her in to begin with. Abortion, at the least, is like the act of expulsion.
And pregnancy, after conception, in an important sense requires no fur-
ther acts. Gestation is automatic, one might say, as long as one omits to
terminate it. This fact makes a difference at least psychologically. It is
harder to pay taxes than to endure government withholding of them. To
donate blood to a relative every day for nine months could easily feel like
a much greater sacrifice than to have something similar occur by itself in
the womb. The power of the non-demandability doctrine is precisely that,
in all contexts (not just abortion), it makes us treat what could be seen as
acts instead as omissions. We ask not "Should he have robbed the bank?"
but "Can we demand that he have his legs broken by those trying to force
him to rob the bank?" I am not suggesting that pregnancy is wholly an
omission and abortion is wholly an act, only that there are important con-
siderations on both sides and the question of non-demandability tends to
make u- overlook one side.
This focus on omission to sacrifice also takes our eyes off immediate
intentions and leads us loosely to speculate about ultimate mo-
tives-something we would be much less likely to do with regard to an
act. In the abortion context, for example, many write as though avoiding
the burdens of pregnancy were the main purpose of abortions,1 9 though
Roe itself emphasized post-natal burdens. 20 But the desire to separate
oneself from the fetus, before or after birth, is not the sole aim of abor-
tions, otherwise adoption would have been mentioned by Roe as an alter-
native way to avoid the burdens to which it points. Clearly, many people
who have abortions aim not just at avoiding the burdens of pregnancy or
of childcare, but at not being mothers at all. A decisive motive may be to
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 96; Thompson, supra note 96; see also G. CALAREsi, supra
note 68, at 114 (noting that the purpose may also be to kill the fetus).
Ito Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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avoid the burdensome adoption choice. The intent then comes to be to
kill the fetus. A lethal act with a lethal intent is much harder to justify or
excuse than a failure to be a hero. Non-demandability makes us forget
the first way of looking at abortion and think only about the second.
Furthermore, just as non-demandability makes us turn away from
the intent of an otherwise illegal act, it tends to make us forget the policy
promoted by the particular law at issue. If we ask only "Can we force
people to kill and risk being killed?," we may say "no." But if we ask
whether national survival justifies the military draft, we may say "yes." If
new life is to be treated as a fundamental public value, as the Spanish
court asserts, it cannot be omitted from the question of how much can be
demanded.' Yet this value is wholly left out of that court's de-
mandability discussions.
Non-demandability also, it seems to me, tends to make us think in
very general terms. Should one have to sacrifice one's legs? Should one be
expected, under penalty, to put up with a handicapped child? The ge-
neric answer to these questions may be "no." But we should also refer to
the various sources of a special duty to make sacrifices. Non-de-
mandability does not in itself"2 allude to those sources.
Thus, U.S. commentators have sought to show that, even if the fetus
were a person, the law should not impose the burden of supporting him or
her on the mother, any more than one should have to support a famous
violinist who needs transfusions for nine months.12 3 But if the fetus is a
person, it is not only a person. It is also one's own child, and that fact
may make all the difference.
It is true that the Spanish high court uses the normal burdens of
parents as a standard of what can be demanded, 24 which is no doubt
higher than the standard for citizens in general. But are parents commit-
ted to putting up only with "normal" burdens? This question is never
clearly addressed. Though the Spanish court uses article 8 necessity as a
prop for its decision, it never discusses that portion of article 8 which
denies the necessity defense to one who has a special obligation to sacri-
fice herself.
Nor are the many possible sources of the duties of parents explored.
Is there a natural duty resulting from a biological relationship? Is there a
duty resulting from causation, from the sexual creation of a situation in
which the fetus is in peril? Or does the act of intercourse involve a tacit
"' See G. FLETCHER, supra note 78 (arguing that even excuse reasoning must involve value-
balancing).
' But demandability as found in the German Penal Code article 35 does require an inquiry
into special legal relationships.
" See supra note 96. The violinist is Thompson's creation.
1,4 See L.F. 11, in BJC, supra note 5, at 535.
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consent to care for life resulting from that act? 2 ' Does it matter that,
if one were still a fetus, one would enter into a social contract to give
birth, even under hardship, to other fetuses in order to be born oneself in
like circumstances? Rather than careful analysis of the strengths of each
such factor, non-demandability (at least as expounded by the Spanish
and German Constitutional Courts) encourages a superficial global
assessment.
Yet in the final analysis, despite all its flaws, the question of de-
mandability should not be overlooked. Most of the myriad sources of ob-
ligation listed above end up with women carrying greater burdens than
men. That is, the burdens even of ordinary pregnancy, not to speak of the
hardship pregnancy, are greater than the burdens our law places on non-
pregnant people during most of their lives and those burdens fall un-
equally onto one sex.1 26 Whether or not we consciously have recourse to a
doctrine of non-demandability, we are bound to feel uneasy about de-
manding that women alone bear such burdens.
There are two ways, in my opinion, that this uneasiness can be over-
come-and both bring us back to the Social State. As the Spanish court
pointed out (L.F. 11) with regard to the burden of handicapped children,
community aid can make the sacrifices entailed by pregnancy and
parenthood much less-to the point where they may be demandable. If
the legal community highly values unborn life, it ought to share the bur-
den of bearing that life by means not only of social support services
before and after birth, but even of special benefits and privileges for
mothers 127-including mothers who give up their children for adoption.
That is what is often done in gratitude to young people who have been
soldiers.
Secondly, the community must not refrain from asking for significant
sacrifices from others besides women who have special abilities to contrib-
ute to what we value in common. From taxation and business regulation
to zoning and blood donation, a high standard of expectation must be
set-and backed up by some sort of penalty for unexcused failure to com-
ply with that standard. Only then will the sacrifices of pregnancy seem
"' Spanish law also creates another exception to article 8's necessity defense for those who
intentionally bring about the state of necessity.
See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 68, at 101 ff.
"' M. GLENDON, supra note 52. Glendon indicates that almost all Western nations provide
maternity benefits, child care, paid leaves, paternity support, family benefits and the like to
a far greater degree than is done in the U.S. Perhaps it is partially for this reason that the
burdens at least of normal pregnancy and parenthood seem not too much to demand in
Germany and Spain.
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obviously demandable. It is on some level bizarre, even if logically consis-
tent, to take a stand both against abortion and for a laissez-faire econ-
omy and society.
